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NOTES
It was also emphasized that the defendant was a commercial
owner. It is to be noted that the court did not find negligence or
impose liability but merely held that the facts alleged stated
a cause of action. It is submitted that this was a sound conclu-
sion. It required little imagination on the part of the defendant
to suspect that the one who had purloined the keys would return
for the car. The defendant also had reason to suspect that the
keys had been taken by an incompetent driver since he knew that
children were in the habit of playing on the lot. In view of these
facts, it does not seem to be an undue burden on the defendant
to hold that reasonable execution of his duty to the public re-
quired that he change the ignition lock or take some other pre-
caution to prevent the car from being taken by an incompetent
driver. This inconvenience is certainly slight when compared
with its effectiveness in minimizing the risk.
It is suggested, however, that the decision should be limited
to its facts and should not be extended to cases where the keys
are not stolen prior to the theft of the automobile or where the
owner has little or no reason to suspect that the thief would be
an incompetent driver. In the absence of facts which would lead
the reasonable man to anticipate the theft and subsequent injury,
leaving the keys in the switch of an unattended automobile
should not of itself be considered negligence or disregard for the
safety of others such as will justify the imposition of liability.
In determining when an owner should be held to anticipate such
misconduct it is suggested that among the factors to be con-
sidered should be the location of the unattended automobile, the
length of time and the time of day that it was left unattended,
and whether the owner knew that the keys had been previously
stolen.
Frank Fontenot
TRUSTS - PROHIBITED SUBSTITUTIONS
The recent case of Succession of Meadors1 illustrates how the
Louisiana courts have restricted the utility of trusts under the
Trust Estates Law.2 In that case a Tennessee domiciliary be-
1. 135 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ; cert. denied, 135 So. 2d 679 (La.
1962).
2. LA. R.S. 9:1791-2212 (1950). The legislature is authorized to provide for
trust estates under LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16. Discussions of the Trust Estates
Law are found in Daggett, Comments by Harriet S. Daggett, 3 WEST's LOUISIANA
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queathed property in trust which included immovable property
in Louisiana. The terms of the trust were: (1) the income was
to be paid to decedent's wife and sister during their lives and,
upon the death of either, to the survivor until her death; (2)
the trustee was authorized to encroach upon the principal to
provide for emergency needs of the wife; and (3) at the death
of the surviving wife or sister, the trustee was to distribute the
trust property to decedent's heirs and next of kin as determined
by Tennessee law. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal construed
the third disposition to be a prohibited substitution3 and on that
basis, without commenting on the other dispositions in the trust,
declared the entire trust unenforceable under Louisiana law.
In the Meadors case the court based its decision on Succession
of Guillory.4 The trusts in the two cases, however, were not
identical. In Guitlory the testator devised immovable property
in trust for the life of a named income beneficiary and, at his
death, to a church organization. The Louisiana Supreme Court
held the disposition to contain a prohibited substitution and
declared it invalid both as to the trustee and as to the church
organization. The court presumably construed the disposition
to contain two separate successive donations of full ownership,
the first to a trustee for the life of the income beneficiary and
the second to the church organization. 5 In Meadors the testator
devised the immovable property in trust for the lives of named
income beneficiaries but charged the trustee with transferring
the property to his heirs and next of kin at the termination of
the trust. Thus, if the Guillory case contained a substitution it
REVISED STATUTES 352 (1950); Oppenheim, Limitations and Uses of Louisiana
Trusts, 27 TUL. L. REV. 41 (1952) ; Roos, Trust Procedure in Louisiana Banks,
13 LA. BUSINESS BULL. No. 3, p. 5 (1951) ; Wisdom, A Trust Code in the Civil
Lazo, Based on the Restatement and Uniform Acts: The Louisiana Trust Estates
Act, 13 TuL. L. REV. 70 (1938).
3. Certain substitutions are prohibited by LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16, and LA.
CIVIL CODE art. 1520 (1870). For a discussion of prohibited substitutions, see
Succession of Bartels, 234 La. 810, 101 So. 2d 678 (1958) ; Succession of Johnson,
223 La. 1058, 67 So. 2d 591 (1953) ; In re Courtin, 144 La. 971, 81 So. 457
(1919) ; Succession of Hall, 141 La. 860, 75 So. 802 (1917) ; Succession of
Stephens, 45 La. Ann. 962, 13 So. 197 (1893) ; Pascal, The Trust Concept and
Substitution, 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 273 (1959) ; Roos, Trust Procedure in
Louisiana Banks, 13 LA. BUSINESS BULL. No. 3, p. 5 (1951) ; SAUNDERS, LEC-
TURES ON THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA 299 (1925).
4. 232 La. 213, 94 So. 2d 38 (1957). For an extensive discussion of the pos-
sible implications of this case see Jackson & Jeter, The Guillory Case: What Are
Its Implications for Private and Charitable Trusts?, 32 TuL. L. REV. 415 (1958).
5. The only reason given by the court in holding the trust unenforceable was
that the bequest was "a prohibited substitution, and, as such, violative of the
public policy of this state as expressed in our basic and statutory law." Succes-
sion of Guillory, 232 La. 213, 217, 94 So. 2d 38, 39 (1957).
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was direct, or non-fideicommissary in character, as the second
donation would have been accomplished by the direct effect of
the expressed volition of the testator. But if the Meadors will
contained a substitution it was indirect or fideic6mmissary in
character, as the second donation would have been accomplished
through the charge imposed on the trustee. The Louisiana Con-
stitution and the Civil Code prohibit both (direct) substitutions
and fidei commissa (indirect substitutions),6 but neither pre-
scribes the effect of a direct substitution. However, under the
jurisprudence such a disposition has been treated as invalid as
to both the first and the second donees. 7 Thus, if the Guiliory
disposition was a direct substitution, the decision in that case
was consistent with the jurisprudence. The Civil Code does de-
clare a fideicommissary substitution invalid as to both donees,5
but the jurisprudence nevertheless has upheld the disposition as
to the first donee and considered it invalid as to the second.9
Thus, if the Meadors disposition was a fideicommissary substitu-
tion, the decision in that case was consistent with the Civil Code
but inconsistent with the jurisprudence.
Although there is some distinction between the Guillory and
Meadors trusts, it would seem that the courts in both cases were
led to consider the respective dispositions to contain substitu-
tions because of the fact that in each "title" to property was
given to a trustee and thereafter was to be received by another.
It is submitted that a prohibited substitution does not come into
being merely because "title" is conveyed to a trustee for the
duration of a trust and thereafter to another. At the end of
every trust the trustee must divest himself of his "title" to
whomever is to have the property free of the trust. Even if this
is a substitution it should not be considered a prohibited substi-
tution because the same section of the Louisiana Constitution
which forbids substitutions also expressly authorizes trusts. 10
This being the case, the prohibition against substitutions would
apply only to double or successive dispositions of beneficial own,
6. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1520 (1870).
7. Succession of Johnson, 223 La. 1058, 67 So. 2d 591 (1953) ; Succession of
Reilly, 136 La. 347, 67 So. 27 (1914).
8. "Every disposition by which the donee, the heir, or legatee is charged to
preserve for or to return a thing to a third person is null, even with regard to
the donee, the instituted heir or the legatee." LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1520 (1870).
9. Succession of Johnson, 223 La. 1058, 67 So. 2d 591 (1953) ; Succession of
Reilly, 136 La. 347, 67 So. 27 (1914).
10. "No law shall be passed authorizing the creation of substitutions, fidei
commissas [sic] or trust estates; except that the legislature may authorize the
creation of trust estates." LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16, as amended.
1962]
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ership. The trustee's "title" is only "legal" without beneficial
interest;" it is a "title" which confers only powers of control
and management over property in the interest of others who
have beneficial rights. The prohibition against substitutions
should not be directed against such powers any more than it is
directed against the powers of a tutor, curator, custodian, execu-
tor, or administrator.
It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether the Guillory
and Meadors trusts contained prohibited substitutions of benefi-
cial interests. The fact that the principal beneficiaries in Guil-
lory and Meadors were not expressly given enjoyment of their
interests at the time of the creation of the trusts should not
necessarily render such trusts invalid as containing prohibited
substitutions. The Louisiana Civil Code permits legacies subject
to a term or condition. 12 Outside of trust, one may give income
interests to specific persons and ownership of the principal to
others at the end of the lives of those receiving the income in-
terests.18 The heirs of the donor retain the ownership of the
principal until the fulfillment of the condition or term. Since
this is possible outside of trust, it should be permissible within a
trust.
Although there would seem to be no objection to postponing
the enjoyment of interests by the principal beneficiaries until
the termination of the trust, it should be mentioned that the Lou-
isiana Trust Estates Law requires beneficiaries to be "in being"
and ascertained at the time the trust is created.1 4 If the Meadors
11. "A trust shall be created when a person . . . transfers the legal title to
property to a trustee in trust for the benefit of himself or a third person." LA.
R.S. 9:1811 (1950). For a discussion of the role of the trustee see Pascal, The
Trust Concept and Substitution, 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 273 (1959) ; RE-
STATEMENT, TRUSTS § 2 (1935).
12. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1527, 1698-1699, 2005-2006, 2030 (1870) ; Pascal,
The Trust Concept and Substitution, 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 273, 283 (1959).
13. It is required, however, that the donees be in being and ascertained at the
time the donation is to take effect. "Two things must concur to enable a legatee
to take under our laws; 1st. He must be in existence at the time of the opening
of the estate; 2d. He must have capacity to receive at that time, if the legacy be
absolute; if it be conditional, it is sufficient if the capacity to receive exists at
the time of the fulfilment of the condition." Milne's Heirs v. Milne's Executors,
17 La. 46, 54 (1841). LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 953-957, 1473-1474, 1482 (1870);
SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA 285 (1925).
14. LA. R.S. 9:1902 (1950). The meaning of "in being" is found in LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 1482 (1870) : "In order to be capable of receiving by donation inter
vivos, it suffices to be conceived at the time of the donation. In order to be capable
of receiving by last will, it suffices to be conceived at the time of the decease.
But the donations or the last will can have effect only in case the child should be
born alive."
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trust is subject to the interpretation that the heirs and next of
kin be determined at the termination of the trust, this provision
would be invalid because the beneficiaries would not necessarily
be "in being" and therefore, ascertainable at the time of the crea-
tion of the trust. However, under Anglo-American law a disposi-
tion in favor of heirs and next of kin such as is found in the
Meadors case would be construed to refer to the heirs and next
of kin ascertained and in being at the testator's death.15 Such a
construction should not be objectionable under Louisiana law.'
Insofar as the disposition of the income in the Meadors trust
is concerned, objection was raised to the provison which author-
ized the shifting of income to the survivor of the income bene-
ficiaries.1 7 But such a disposition does not appear to be objec-
tionable under Louisiana law. Successive usufructs are author-
ized and are not considered prohibited substitutions.'5 An in-
come interest is a kind of usufruct under the Civil Code.' 9 Suc-
cessive income interests should be 'as valid as successive usu-
fructs and not be considered prohibited substitutions.
The validity of the provision in the Meadors trust authoriz-
ing the trustees to invade the principal is questionable, although
such is permitted under the Trust Estates Law. 20 The reason is
that this type of provision is in the nature of a substitution be-
cause the interest in the principal beneficiary can be made to
shift from him to another. The Constitution authorizes the crea-
tion of Anglo-American type trusts, but the dispositions within a
trust must not violate the consitutional prohibition against sub-
15. SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 97 (1951).
16. Every consideration should be given to the fact that wills such as in the
Meadors case are drafted in other jurisdictions according to Anglo-American law
techniques and conflict of law principles would require the Louisiana courts to
uphold the validity of the wishes of the testator if the will is capable of both a
lawful and an unlawful interpretation. Such a result would be required under
Louisiana law as well. "[I]f it can be said that the will is equally and easily
susceptible of either of the two interpretations . . . we would under the law be
compelled to adopt the one which would save the life of the will rather than the
one which would strike it down." Swart v. Lane, 160 La. 217, 220, 106 So. 833,
834 (1926). See Succession of May, 109 La. 994, 34 So. 52 (1903) ; Succession
of Meunier, 52 La. Ann. 79, 26 So. 776 (1899) ; Heikamp v. Succession of Solari,
54 So. 2d 347 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951) ; LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1712-1713 (1870).
17. Succession of Meadors, 135 So.2d 679, 682 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961). Suc-
cessive income interests are authorized by LA. R.S. 9:2100 (E) (1950).
18. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 609 (1870) ; McCalop v. Stewart, 11 La. Ann. 106
(1856) ; Jackson & Jeter, The Guillory Case: What Are Its Implications for Pri-
vate and Charitable Trusts?, 32 TUL. L. REV. 415, 423 (1958) ; Pascal, The Trust
Concept and Substitution, 19 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 273, 283 (1959).
19. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 607 (1870).
20. LA. R.S. 9:1923 (1950). For an explanation of this section see Oppen-
heim, Limitations and Uses of Louisiana Trusts, 27 TUL. L. REV. 41, 46-47 (1952).
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stitutions.21 Therefore, the Trust Estates Law may be unconsti-
tutional on this point and this particular provision in the
Meadors trust would be invalid as to Louisiana property. 22
But even if the invasion of the principal provision of the
Meadors trust were invalid, it should not have the effect of in-
validating the entire trust. First, the Trust Estates Law itself
provides that if an invalid provision can be separated from the
rest of the trust without defeating the purpose of the settlor in
creating it, that portion of the trust which is not invalid shall
not fail.2 Second, even though the invasion of principal provision
would be considered a fideicommissary substitution and invalid
as to both the "instituted" and "substituted" donees according to
the Civil Code,2 4 the provision concerns only the disposition of
the beneficial interest in the principal and not that of the bene-
ficial interest in the income from the trust. Hence the Meadors
trust should have been held valid at least as to the income inter-
est of the named beneficiaries. In that case the heirs of the testa-
tor according to Louisiana law (the property being in Louisiana)
should have been considered entitled to the land subject to the
trust, or, more precisely, as principal beneficiaries under the
trust by operation of law. Moreover, under the jurisprudence
which strikes down the second disposition in a fideicommissary
substitution and not the first, 5 the Mectdors trust should have
been upheld in its entirety except for the invasion of principal
provision.
It has been the purpose of this Comment to show that the
decisions in the Guillory and Meadors cases are not in harmony
with the intent of the constitutional and statutory law providing
for trusts in Louisiana. If these cases are an indication as to
21. "No law shall be passed authorizing the creation of substitutions, fidei
commissas (sic) or trust estates; except that the legislature may authorize the
creation of trust estates." LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16, as amended. LA. R.S. 9:1861
(1950); Pascal, Some ABC's About Trusts and Us, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
555, 559-60 (1953).
22. Doubt as to the validity of LA. R.S. 9:1923 (1950) authorizing the trustee
to invade the principal is also raised in Jackson & Jeter, The Guillory Case: What
Are Its Implications for Private and Charitable Trusts?, 32 TUL. L. REV. 415, 424
(1958).
23. "If a provision in the terms of the trust be invalid for any of the reasons
stated in R.S. 9:1842, or for any other reason, the intended trust shall fail
altogether if, but only if, the invalid provision cannot be separated from the other
provisions without defeating the purpose of the settlor in creating the trust." LA.
R.S. 9:1843 (1950).
24. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1520 (1870).
25. Succession of Johnson, 223 La. 1058, 67 So. 2d 591 (1953) ; Succession of
Reilly, 136 La. 347, 67 So. 27 (1914).
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how the use of the trust will be limited in the future, there is a
need for trust law revision. The Louisiana Law Institute is
presently preparing a proposed revision of the Trust Estates
Law. It is hoped that the Institute will give favorable considera-
tion to recommending legislation which will remove these stum-
bling blocks to the employment of trusts in Louisiana.
Frank F. Foil
